Post by AriadneSince he is at all times an antisemite, this request for information is
uk.politics.misc, soc.culture.israel, soc.culture.jewish,
soc.culture.british, alt.politics.british
The antisemite's habit is to avoid posting to Jewish groups
in order promulgate his Nazism without repercussion.
His attempt to limit response to his hatreds however
does not even work in British groups, thanks to those
who abhor his foul posts and his attempt to strip
others of freedom.
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Sharon Has Won
By Benjamin Granby
21 August, 2005
Counterpunch
Ramallah.
All eyes are on Gaza. What the late Labor Minister Yisrael Galili in
1971 termed a great experiment in "Zionist socialism" is coming to an
end with the evacuation of some 8000 Israeli settlers and their
supporters from the occupied Gaza Strip. News channels, Arabian based
ones, are transfixed in what seems to be a tumultuous struggle between
Israel's fundamentalist right-wing and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's
apparent pragmatic plan. Others instead argue that the real struggle is
only going to emerge later when it remains to be seen if the
Palestinian Authority (PA) can maintain control over its newly
liberated areas in the most desolate and desperate corner of the
Palestinian Territories. The reality, however, is that Sharon has
already won, regardless of the outcome.
When Ariel Sharon announced his "Disengagement Plan" in early 2004 he
stunned not only Israeli society but also the world community as well.
The "Father of the Settlements" who had so shied away from peace
negotiations during the first four years of the Intifada was now making
a bold unilateral move. The term for "disengagement" in Hebrew,
Hitnatkut, also can mean "cutting off," and with his plan to dismantle
the settlements in the Gaza Strip and redeploy the Israeli army to its
borders, Sharon is in fact cutting off the Palestinians from the peace
process. As Jerusalem based reporters Jerrold Kessel and Pierre
Klochendler put it, Sharon's method relies on "managing the conflict
with the Palestinians much more than it is about actually resolving the
conflict."
The critical foundation lurking within Sharon's plan, which remains
obscured by the recent internecine clashes between the Yesha Council
and the Israeli police, is that he has discharged himself of any
concerns about Gaza's fate: regardless if the PA experiment succeeds or
fails in Gaza, Sharon has won. Domestically, Sharon has at least
forestalled Israel's demographic dilemma by cutting off 1.3 million
Palestinians from the rest of Israel and he has appeased the Left, who
often put the blame on Israel's growing poverty on expenses for the
settlement project. Internationally, Sharon is being hailed as taking a
critical move towards for peace, and, as the Israeli U.N. Ambassador
Dan Gillerman predicts, Israel "bashing" in the UN will come to an end.
As for the Palestinians, former MK Amnon Rubinstein, a supporter of the
plan, has admitted that Gaza will "cease to be Israel's responsibility
in the eyes of the world. This would be a huge advantage, an
existential advantage" Essentially, either Palestinians will be
preoccupied with developing Gaza as settlements in the West Bank become
permanent, or Gaza will falter and Sharon will be hailed as having
proven that Palestinians are incapable of self-rule.
It is true that in his speech to the Israeli people on the evacuations
in Gaza on August 17, Ariel Sharon made stark references to the
horrible conditions Palestinians there live with, something almost
unheard of coming from the man who personally oversaw much of the
demolition of the region in campaigns during1955 and 1956. But it is
important to recall that Sharon is a master of deception when he has a
unilateral policy in mind. As Defense Minister under Menachim Begin in
1982, Ariel Sharon systematically lied to his own boss and fellow
Cabinet Members about the aims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
Repeatedly Begin's Cabinet found itself post facto approving actions
already taken by Sharon, such as the penetration of Beirut, if for no
other reason than to catch up with facts on the ground.
On the Palestinian side, much has been made of the potential political
clashes between Hamas (who has already claimed credit for the Israeli
pullback) and the PA. There are two simple scenarios for the short-term
future of Gaza, one of chaos or one of orderly development. But even if
the latter scenario emerges, Ariel Sharon will still have the upper
hand, for many Palestinians see the "disengagement plan" as a move to
not only placate the United States and European Union, but allows for a
reassertion, if not expansion, of the Israel's settlement plan in the
West Bank. Indeed, even as settlers are being moved from Gaza, new
"neighborhoods" in occupied East Jerusalem are springing up, while much
of the West Bank is imprisoned in what Palestinians call the Wall of
Racial Division. As Ghazi Hamed, editor of Gaza's al-Resala, explains,
"We will be worrying about mounds of garbage and trying to get
investment, while [Sharon] carries on building a wall around
Jerusalem."
The PLO, which has developed into the backbone of the PA, has had great
difficulty in making the transformation from a revolutionary movement
into building a civil society. Often seen as archaic and hopelessly
corrupt under Arafat (Thomas Friedman often opines that the second
Intifada was as much a revolt against the Palestinian old guard as it
was against Israel), Hamas and Islamic Jihad have gained immense
amounts of popularity. While the PLO's Fatah paints slogans around the
West Bank proclaiming that they have been "fighting the struggle for 40
years," the Islamic parties are expected to do very well in next
January's Parliamentary elections. This is especially so in Gaza, which
has seen a skyrocketing rise in unemployment and poverty during the
last five years.
While Israel is retreating from Gaza with a 'hands-free, care-free'
attitude, the United States has placed its bets on economic development
to solve Gaza's political ills, and has made former World Bank director
James Wolfenshoen its head envoy. But while Israel has withdrawn its
forces from within Gaza, they still remain in total control without;
giving lie to the illusion that the occupation in Gaza has ended,
Israel remains in control of Gaza's economic future and Sharon
doesn't seem to care.
Gaza's Economic Future
Sharon's unilateral policy on Gaza has remained conspicuously vague in
delineating what powers and autonomy it will return to the Palestinian
Authority. Only with pressure from the Quartet and the World Bank have
the Israelis hinted at what areas they are willing to ease restrictions
on. Of greatest concern to the economic health of Gaza is external
access to goods, namely the reorganization of land borders, the
re-opening of Gaza's air and seaports and the future of the
Israeli-Palestinian customs union.
The economic situation of the Gaza Strip is bleak. Even before the
recent Intifada and ruinous Israeli invasions and demolitions, Gaza's
post-Oslo economic outlook was only moderately positive. The limited
autonomy given to Gaza through the Oslo Accords placed it in an
economic orbit wholly dependent on Israel. In addition to having to
purchase all necessary resources non-competitively from the occupying
power, Israeli goods were given preferential treatment, primarily at
the expense of Palestinian goods from the West Bank. Essentially,
Israel has established what one scholar has described as lasting
"predatory colonial economic relations" with the Palestinian
Territories, which were only solidified in the Oslo Accords and remain
in effect today.
Gaza's vitality was almost completely squelched during the four and a
half years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, where poverty and unemployment
soared while the Israeli army claimed the lives of thousands and
engaged untold physical destruction. In urban environments where
already almost half of the population are refugees, a further 25,000
homes were either totally or partially destroyed by Israeli operations.
Furthermore, Israel's repeated internal and external closures
devastated the economy, pushing poverty past 65% and unemployment to
over 35% (unofficially as high as 70%). Finally, The World Bank
asserted that while the ceasefire and end to closures are clearly
beneficial to Gaza's recovery, the outlook for some 16% of Palestinians
living at mere subsistence levels is not likely to change.
In order for Palestine to (re)build its economy, it needs to attract
foreign direct investment. This has been exacerbated by Israel's
announcement that it intends by 2008 to end its long-time policy of
allowing Palestinian workers into Israel. Confidence is critical to
long-term investment strategies and Sharon's plan clearly does not do
enough to bring back the full confidence and hope that Gaza attracted
in 1995. The Palestinian Authority estimates that since the start of
the Intifada, private-sector investment fell by over two-thirds.
Outside assistance will prove critical in addition to what the G8
recently pledged for the Palestinian Territories. Yet there are still
fundamental steps Israel could take to help bring in the private
investments that are critical for Gaza's long-term success.
Israel's border policies are key, not just to investor confidence, but
to the very sustenance of the Palestinian Territories. Currently,
Israel has agreed to revamp the Erez and Karni crossings into Israel,
promising new high-tech security checks that should expedite cargo
transit (paid for by USAID). This is a first step, but not enough to
win the full confidence of those who may wish to do business in Gaza.
The World Bank has urged Israel to duplicate these facilities so that
should a security incident warrant the closure of one crossing, goods
can still quickly make their way though. In addition, anyone operating
in these situations would expect proper arbitration and dispute
resolution mechanisms if, say, produce spoiled because of delays.
Israel so far has not agreed to establish these with the Palestinian
Authority.
Furthermore, the 'back-to-back' system of transportation that Israel
has forced the Palestinians to operate with only exacerbate costs and
time. While the disengagement in Gaza will eliminate the need to
transfer goods between vehicles at checkpoints internally, this
duplicitous system will remain at the borders: vehicles from Gaza
cannot enter Israel or the West Bank and vice versa. Without a further
opening of Gaza's borders, few investors would find it sensible to do
business in Gaza. As Akiva Eldar summarized in a recent editorial, "a
Palestinian worker who is detained three hours at the barricade cannot
compete with a Thai worker who lives in his boss' storage room."
In addition to a loosening of controls over Gaza's borders, it is also
imperative that Israel consents to the re-opening of Gaza's air and
seaports. The reopening of Gaza's airport, which was heavily damaged by
the IDF in the recent conflict, has not progressed, and Israel has
hinted that it will only allow helicopter traffic in the near future,
impairing the potential for business contacts from neighboring
countries to have easy access.
A final major point of contention is Israel's announced intention of
abrogating the "quasi"customs agreement with the Palestinians in the
Gaza strip. The Palestinian Authority has rejected this, noting that it
would not only be damaging to economic prospects in the immediate
future, but would also further alienate the Gaza Strip from the West
Bank and East Jerusalem. The present arrangement gives Palestinian
goods an edge in Israeli markets while generating critical tax revenue
for the PA. The World Bank has warned that while the current customs
agreement should not remain in place for long, it is essential to Gaza
in the short term for getting its agricultural and industrial economy
back on its feet and ending the union at this point would greatly
increase transaction costs for Gaza-West Bank commerce.
Dr. Aharon Kleiman of Tel Aviv University further stressed that an
abrogation of the quasi-customs union with has the potential to turn a
future Palestinian nation into a bifurcated state. The creation of two
entities with separate economic arrangements could fracture Palestinian
unity. This would be a severe blow to Palestinian nationalism and
further push Gaza into Egypt's economic orbit while the West Bank would
likely orient itself more towards Jordan.
Finally, there is a need for a rapid and direct link between Gaza and
the West Bank. With Sharon's unilateral move for disengagement, this
subject has naturally not been fleshed out in negotiations. Potential
options that take Israel's security concerns into consideration involve
either a raised or sunken highway or a rail link connecting the two
territories. Such a move would intertwine the two territories
economically and allowing price convergence and boost internal markets.
Finally, the link is clearly essential for a unified Palestinian
national identity.
At the Sharm El-Sheikh summit between Israeli and Palestinian leaders,
PM Sharon declared, "together we can ensure our people's lives of
freedom and stability, prosperity and peace." While his rhetoric might
be in the right place, it is unfortunate that Israel's current steps
towards peace remain unilateral directives with only minimal
cooperation with the Palestinians. Former MK Avraham Burg, a founding
member of Peace Now and whose father served in the Begin Cabinet with
the current Prime Minister, has termed the whole escapade a "vast
fraud". The redeployment plan is a thinly veiled attempt for Sharon to
solidify Israeli control over the West Bank, maintain an obfuscated
occupation of the Gaza Strip and to splinter what should be a united
and free Palestinian nation. No matter what, Sharon has taken the
initiative and for the old warrior it means he has won this round.
Benjamin Granby works for the Palestine Monitor in Ramallah, West Bank,
is a former human rights worker in Gaza City and is author of the
forthcoming, Welcome to the Bethlehem Star Hotel from Garrett County
Press.